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Customers’ participation in service co-production processes has been increasing with the rapid
development of self-service technologies and business models that rely on self-service as the main
service delivery channel. However, little is known about how the level of participation of customers
in service delivery processes inﬂuences the competition among service providers. In this paper, a
game-theoretic model is developed to study the competition among service providers when self-
service is an option. The analysis of the equilibria from this model shows that, given a certain
l e v e lo fc u s t o m e re ﬃciency, the proportion of the service task outsourced to the customer is a
decisive factor in the resulting competitive equilibria. In the long run, two extreme formats of
service delivery are expected to prevail rather than any mixture of both: either complete employee
service or complete self-service. In the two-ﬁrm queuing game, we ﬁnd that both ﬁrms are better oﬀ
when they both deliver their service through self-service. It is also shown that full-service providers
dominate the market if ﬁrms providing service products featuring self-service fail to have enough
market demand at a proﬁtable price. Meanwhile, the limited ranges of customer eﬃciency and the
price for the self-service-only product are shown to be essential conditions for the coexistence of
the diﬀerent types of service providers.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Customers’ involvement is generally indispensable for the completion of service production and de-
livery processes, although the degree of involvement varies from service product to service product.
In some cases, customers provide only minimal assistance and remain passively involved through-
out the process. In other cases, customers play more active roles by substituting employee service
with their self-service. In recent years, the development of so-called self-service technologies have
enabled customers’ role transitions from passive involvement to active self-service in many indus-
tries. Many new business models aimed at utilizing customer self-service have appeared and have
succeeded in establishing a market position and gaining market share, such as Internet banking,
Internet brokerage, and Internet auctions. It is of interest from both an academic and practitioner
viewpoint to study the competition between the newly emerging self-service-based service providers
and the more traditional, employee—service-based service providers. Examples of such competition
include the competition between the newly emerging Internet stock trading companies that have
customers trading stocks and the traditional brokerage companies that have their employees trade
stocks for the customers.
Though many factors may inﬂuence the outcome of such a competition, the distribution of the
workload between the ﬁrm and the customer, or the self-service level, is clearly a decisive factor.
First, the diﬀerent level of self-service, or the diﬀerent proportion of the workload outsourced
to the customer, often means signiﬁcant diﬀerences in terms of a ﬁrms’ service delivery process,
infrastructure, and costs. Secondly, the level of self-service deﬁnes the scale and scope of the impact
of customers’ participation on service quality. As customer self-service constitutes a signiﬁcant part
of the service, her own productivity or eﬃciency (customer eﬃciency) is also expected to have a
certain inﬂuence on service quality and demand.
Consequently, customers’ increasing parcipation in service co-production processess is also ex-
pected to bring changes in a competitive market: how will the newly emerged service ﬁrms that
sell service products featuring self-service compete against the traditional service providers who
oﬀer more employee-based service delivery? Will the self-service ﬁrms ever be able to gain enough
market share from the traditional service providers to survive? Will they prevail and drive the tra-
ditional employee service ﬁrms out of the market? Will the two types coexist in the market? More
fundamentally, when should a ﬁrm choose to provide a self-service product and when to provide an
employee-based service product? What are the implications of the results of this competition on
the design of ﬁrms’ service delivery processes, infrastructures, and costs? Should ﬁrms choose the
extreme format of service delivery, either complete self-service or complete employee service (full-
service), or a mixture of the two? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative
and how can their choices inﬂuence the outcome of the market competition?
2In addition, what are the customers’ roles in such a market competition? Traditionally, cus-
tomers inﬂuence the outcome of market competition through their inﬂuence on market demand.
Increasingly, customers can also inﬂuence competition as co-producers. How will customers’ mul-
tiple inﬂuences on not only demand but also cost and quality aﬀect the competitive outcome?
To address these issues in this paper, we investigate the role of self-service and customer eﬃ-
ciency in market competition when service co-production is involved. In particular, given a certain
l e v e lo fc u s t o m e re ﬃciency, we study how the level of self-service, or the distribution of the work-
load between the customer and the ﬁrm, inﬂuences ﬁrms’ competitive strategies and the resulting
market equilibria. To accomplish this analysis, we use a two-ﬁrm queuing game model in which the
ﬁrms compete with each other in a single service product market. We consider a simpliﬁed situation
where any proportion of the service task can be accomplished by either the ﬁrm’s employees or by
the customer. That is, we assume that any proportion of the service job can be outsourced to the
customer. This assumption generally holds as long as the service task is not too complicated or
does not require highly professional, specialized skills. In fact, even when a service delivery requires
professional expertise, there is always certain part of it that can be or has to be completed by the
customer (e.g., providing certain information needed for customization, billing, and shipping).
With the queuing game model, we show that in the long-run, the optimal proportion of the
workload completed through self-service is either 0% or 100%. In fact, setting the self-service level
at a certain value between zero and 100% can actually minimize a ﬁrm’s proﬁt. This is an interesting
theoretical ﬁnding in that it predicts that the two extreme formats of service delivery, complete
self-service and full-service, will prevail and that an intermediate solution will not be optimal.
We also ﬁnd that an equilibrium in which both ﬁrms require all the service to be completed
through self-service is the most proﬁtable for both ﬁrms in a two-ﬁrm game, despite the fact that
the two ﬁrms actually charge the lowest explicit price for the service product in such a (self-service,
self-service) equilibrium.
More importantly, even though the higher proﬁts of a (self-service, self-service) equilibrium
may result from substituting generally more costly employee service with less costly self-service,
we ﬁnd that the existence of the most proﬁtable (self-service, self-service) equilibrium relies on the
prevention of downstream price cuts, which is actually realized through completely outsourcing the
service task to the customer. The existence of the (self-service, self-service) equilibrium requires
the explicit price for the self-service-only service product to be higher than a certain threshold.
With economies of scale present, ﬁrms may attempt to cut prices in order to increase the demand
and lower the average cost. As a result, it is not guaranteed that the price of the self-service-only
product will not become lower than the threshold. However, by outsourcing the service task to the
customer completely, each ﬁrm faces constant returns to scale instead of economies of scale, which
3makes further demand-increasing price cut as an attempt to increase the demand and lower the
average cost unnecessary and therefore prevents the downstream price cut that may endanger the
existence of the (self-service, self-service) equilibrium.
In addition, we ﬁnd that (full-service, full-service) can prevail only if the self-service-only busi-
ness model doesn’t manage to charge a high enough price in order to generate a suﬃcient proﬁt
margin. This may explain at least partially why many self-service business models that appeared
during the e-commerce boom later failed to survive in markets dominated by full-service providers.
The lack of customers’ willingness to pay a certain price for self-service products, or the demand
of the customers to be compensated for the self-service they contribute, undermines those ﬁrms’
ability to generate enough market demand at a proﬁtable price.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that self-service-only ﬁrms and full-service ﬁrms can coexist in equilibrium
if customers aren’t either highly eﬃcient or highly ineﬃcient, and the explicit price for the self-
service-only product is neither too high or too low. This ﬁnding may help to explain the coexistence
of both types of service providers in many service industries. Customers’ medium level of eﬃciency
makes the existence of both service channels feasible. The price of the self-service product is neither
cheap enough to drive the full-service provider out the market, nor expensive enough to prevent
the self-service ﬁrms from grabbing market share from the full-service provider.
In Section 2 we review the related literature. The model is described in Section 3 and the game
is discussed in Section 4. The results are discussed in Section 5 along with the existing limitations
and potential extensions.
2 Literature Review
Our work is related to three main streams in the service operations management literature. The ﬁrst
stream considers the inﬂuence of customer’s participation and choice-making on a service operation.
The second stream involves the extensive literature on queuing games. The third group includes
works in outsourcing and vertical integration in operations management as well as in economics
and marketing.
First, some previous works have been devoted to the study of customers’ participation in service
operations processes from diﬀerent perspectives. Chase (1978) discusses customers’ involvement
in service operations and its potential inﬂuence on the service delivery process. Lovelock and
Young (1979) suggest that customers’ participation can help a ﬁrm to increase its productivity with
appropriate design of self-service interfaces. Mills and Morris (1986) discuss the “partial” employee
roles that customers have been playing in some service organizations by undertaking part of the
workload. Karmarkar and Pitbladdo (1995) provide a comprehensive literature review on service
4markets and competition and point out that an important research topic is understanding how a
customer’s engagement in service delivery processes will inﬂuence the design of the process as well
as competition in the market. Heskett, Sasser, and Schlesinger (1997) suggest that by encouraging
customers to share responsibility, ﬁrms can not only reduce their costs but also improve service
quality. Xue and Harker (2002) discuss the potential impact of customers’ increasing participation
in service co-production processes enabled by new information technology and present the concept
of customer eﬃciency to characterize a customer’s role as a co-producer. The concept of customer
eﬃciency as deﬁned in Xue and Harker (2002) is used herein. Though the signiﬁcance of customers’
participation is conceptually discussed and highlighted in these previous papers, no analytical model
has been developed to study how the level of customers’ participation or involvement, which is a
key parameter for the design of a service delivery process, and customer eﬃciency, a key measure
of a customer’s performance, inﬂuence a service ﬁrm’s infrastructure, service quality, and demand
function, and, consequently, the competition among service ﬁrms requiring diﬀerent levels of self-
service in their delivery processes.
There are several previous studies in which customers’ inﬂuence is explicitly considered in a
queuing model. Ha (1998) presents a GI/GI/1 queuing model with customer-chosen service rates
and linear delay costs to solve the pricing problem of a single service facility where the facility
and the customers jointly produce services. It is shown that due to congestion externalities, the
service rate chosen by customers are always suboptimal for the facility and an optimal incentive-
pricing scheme is developed to achieve optimal arrival rates and induce customers to choose optimal
service rates. While in Ha (1998) the competition among service providers is not considered, we
are primarily concerned about how customers’ participation may inﬂuence the outcome of such
competition. One of the key factors that we are interested in is the varying level of self-service or
the proportion of the workload outsourced to the customer along with customer eﬃciency, which
is not modeled in Ha (1998). In our model, the service rate for employee-delivered service is
determined by the ﬁrm, not by the choice of a customer; and the service rate for self-service is a
function of customer eﬃciency (pre-speciﬁed constant). In addition, the proportion of the workload
that is outsourced to the customer is determined by the ﬁrm, not by the choice of a customer. Hall
and Porteus (2000) present a quality competition model for a queuing and inventory system with
no economies of scale. Gans (2002) develops a customer choice model in response to random
variation in quality to study the inﬂuence of service quality on customer loyalty and then develops
a normative model of the quality competition in an oligopoly based on this choice model. In our
model, economies of scale are considered, customers do not have previous experience or history to
base their choices on, and their choices are based solely on the full prices associated with the service
product, which includes the explicit fee and customers’ opportunity cost of service time (including
5both self-service time and employee service time), rather than any single part of the full price (e.g.,
service time which reﬂects service quality).
In addition to the above mentioned papers that have explicitly considered the impact of cus-
tomer’s inputs in a queuing model, there is an extensive body of research works focusing on capacity
and pricing problems with queuing systems that is related to our work in a general sense. These
papers consider delay in service as a cost for the customer that has a negative eﬀect on customer
utility, and investigate related capacity and pricing decisions of a service facility. Mendelson (1985),
Mendelson and Whang (1990), Dewan and Medelson (1990), Stidham (1992), So and Song (1998),
van Meighem (2000), Mandelbaum and Shimkin (2000) analyze the issues in the case of a sin-
gle service provider (monopoly). Others use competitive analysis approach: Reitman (1991), Li
(1992), Kalai, Kamien and Rubinovitch (1992), Li and Lee (1994), Loch (1994), Deneckere and
Peck (1995), Gilbert and Weng (1997), Leder and Li (1997), Armony and Haviv (1998), Chayet
and Hopp (1999), and Cachon and Harker (2002). Some of these models consider the ﬁrms com-
peting against each other only in one aspect, either price or performance but not both, while some
others do not consider economies of scale. Self-service is generally not explicitly considered in these
models.There are also studies on customers’ competition for faster service using queuing models:
Naor (1969), Lippman and Stidham (1977), Bell and Stidham (1983), Kulkarni (1983), Mendelson
(1985), and Afeche and Mendelson (2001). In our model we consider the competition of the ﬁrms
rather than that of the customers.
Cachon and Harker (2002) investigate the impact of the presence of economies of scale on market
competition between ﬁrms that provide similar service products and found that the existence of
economies of scale provides a strong motivation for outsourcing. The model we apply herein is
an extension of the queuing game model in Cachon and Harker (2002). While Cachon and Harker
(2002) are primarily concerned about the eﬀect of economies of scale on ﬁrms’ outsourcing decisions
in a competitive environment, we focus on the impact of the level of customers’ participation
and customer eﬃciency on service providers’ competition. Cachon and Harker (2002) consider
outsourcing to an outside supplier whose goal is to maximize its proﬁt; we consider herein a special
case of outsourcing, one in which the service task is delegated to the customer who wants to minimize
her cost, including both the time opportunity cost to complete the service and the explicit purchase
cost. While an outside supplier generally has no direct inﬂuence on the demand function a ﬁrm
faces, customers has a more complicated inﬂuence on the competition through their dual roles as
both co-producers and patrons with direct inﬂu e n c eo nb o t hs e r v i c eq u a l i t y( s e r v i c et i m e )a n d
demand. Cachon and Harker (2002) consider either to keep the whole service operation in-house
or to outsource it completely; we consider the more general case of service co-production wherein
the ﬁrm can outsource any proportion of the whole service task to the customer, ranging from
6zero to 100%. That is, the proportion of the workload outsourced to the customer can be any
continuous value within the range between zero and one (including zero and one). One of our
ﬁndings is consistent with the ﬁnding in Cachon and Harker (2002): economies of scale provide a
strong motivation for outsourcing to customers.
Besides Cachon and Harker (2002), there is an extensive literature in outsourcing that relates to
our work. In particular, our work is related to the body of operations management literature that
considers the primary beneﬁt of outsourcing as cost-reduction: McMillan (1990), Venkatesan (1992),
and van Miegham (1999). In economics, transaction cost theory (Willamson 1979), incomplete
contracts (Grossman and Hart 1986), and assets ownership (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 2001) are
used to explain the motivation for outsourcing. In marketing, migrating price competition is shown
to be one major beneﬁt for suppliers to outsource the retailing function (McGuire and Staelin
1983). Outsourcing to customers is generally not explicitly considered in the previous literature.
As discussed before, outsourcing to customers is unique and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from a third
party usually considered in the outsourcing literature as customers play dual roles in the service
operations processes and, consequently, have multiple inﬂuences on market competition.
3M o d e l
In our model, there are two ﬁrms (Firm i and Firm j) that compete with each other in a market
consisting of one service product. The production and delivery of this service product is a co-
production process in which customers can be required to contribute certain amount of labor.
That is, in general, the process consists of two phases: ﬁrst, a customer performs self-service using
self-service technology supported by the ﬁrm; and second, a customer enters an M/M/1 queue at
the ﬁrm’s service counter to get personal service from the ﬁrm’s employees. For each customer,
the system is a two-server system where a customer serves himself/herself at the ﬁrst server and
the employee serves the customer at the second server. We also assume that the ﬁrm can choose
to provide only self-service support with no employee counter service, or to provide full employee
service with no self-service required or supported. In the ﬁrst case, customers complete self-service
at the self-service server and then exit the system; in the second case, customers go to the employee
server directly without going through the self-service server. In particular, we make the following
assumptions:
1. Any part of the workload can be accomplished either through customer self-service or with
employee counter service. The level of self-service is represented by ρi, 0 ≤ ρi ≤ 1.T h e
change of workload allocation is accounted for by the change of the service rate. For example,
cutting a ﬁrm employee’s service workload in half is equivalent to doubling her service rate.
7To simplify the the notation, we normalize the workload wi =1 .
2. Customers arrive at the system with demand rate di.
3. The waiting time for self-service is zero, and the expected self-service service time is
si = ρiei (1)
where ei indicates the inverse of the expected customer’s productivity (customer eﬃciency).
4. There is inﬁnite waiting space at the employee server. Expected time a customer spends in
the employee service sub-system (including waiting time in the queue and employee service






where µi indicates the expected employee productivity (employee eﬃciency).
5. We assume that the customer group is homogeneous in terms of unit opportunity cost, which
is normalized to one.
The system described above is similar to the so-called tandem or sequential queuing system.
3.1 Demand Function
The market demand function for each ﬁrm is a function of the full prices of both ﬁrms. For a
customer, the full price includes the explicit purchase price, the opportunity cost of self-service
time, and the opportunity cost of the time spent at Firm i to receive employee service, with
customers’ unit opportunity cost normalized to one, an assumption that we may relax in future
research. Thus, the full price consists of three parts: the explicit fees, pi, the implicit price of
self-service (i.e., the time that a customer is expected to spend for self-service), si,a n dt h eﬁrm’s
performance (the time that a customer is expected to spend at Firm i to receive the employee
service), gi. That is, for Firm i (analogously for Firm j), the demand function is:
di (fi,f j)=di (pi + si + gi,p j + sj + gj) (3)
Assume that customers only act upon the full price. That is, any combination of explicit fees,
implicit cost for self-service, and ﬁrm performance that add up to the same full price level is viewed
as the same from a customer’s perspective. The two ﬁrms simultaneously decide on the full prices,
including the explicit fee and the self-service level (consequently, customers’ cost of self-service time
8and employee service time).We also assume that for any given fi and fj, resulting in a ﬁxed demand
rate di,F i r mi has a unique optimal distribution of the total workload, ρi, which results in a unique
(si,g i),g i v e nw o r k l o a d ,c u s t o m e re ﬃciency, and employee eﬃciency.
3.2 Cost Function
We assume that the ﬁrm incurs a direct capacity cost for counter support (i.e., niµi) but does
not incur a direct capacity cost for self-service. Instead, we consider an indirect cost of customer
self-service in this model. The indirect cost of self service results from the fact that a customer may
be less eﬃcient for a given service task and, hence requires more time to complete ρi units of the
work than the ﬁrm employee could. We acknowledge that in reality there is the cost for building
and maintaining the necessary infrastructure for customer self-service (e.g., an Internet bank incurs
the cost for building and maintaining its website and database as well as the cost for the back oﬃce
operations that support customer self-service). However, self-service technology is, in general, a
relatively low cost means to deliver service to the customers as it signiﬁcantly reduces the amount
of labor costs and eliminates the huge capital investment for having brick-and-mortar stores. When
taking into account the usually large capacity associated with the self-service technology such as a
website linked to a database, the average cost per self-service is much lower than the average cost
per employee service. For example, on average a transaction completed by the customer through
the Internet costs the bank $0.17 while the same transaction completed by a bank employee at
the bank’s branch costs $1.59 according to the data from a major U.S. retail bank. Given the
magnitude of the diﬀerence, in order to keep the model analytically tractable, we assume that the
direct unit capacity cost is almost negligible relative to the unit capacity cost for employee counter
service. In fact, the model can be easily extended to include a direct cost for self-service support
a n dm a n yo ft h er e s u l t sh e r e i nw i l ls t i l lh o l d .
Therefore, Firm i’s self-service support capacity cost is zero and its employee-based service
capacity cost is ni · µi to operate with a service rate
µi =( g−1
i + di)(1 − ρi). (4)
Firm i incurs higher capacity cost at a service counter when it lowers the service time or increases
the work load. A ﬁrm’s capacity cost for employee service is also inﬂuenced by the demand rate.
Thus, Firm i’s cost function is:
Ci = niµi = ni(g−1
i + di)(1 − ρi),n i > 0,ρ i ∈ [0,1] (5)
93.3 ProﬁtF u n c t i o n
We have the following proﬁt function for Firm i:
πi(fi,g i,ρ i,f j)=( fi − ρiei − gi)di − ni(g−1
i + di)(1 − ρi),ρ i ∈ [0,1] (6)
With (fi,ρ i,f j) ﬁxed, we have:
∂πi
∂gi





= −2ni(1 − ρi)g−3
i < 0 (8)
Equation (8) shows that with (fi,ρ i,f j) ﬁxed, πi is concave with respect to gi.A l s ou s i n gt h eﬁrst
order condition (FOC) for optimization, the optimal operational performance of employee service







Thus, Firm i’s proﬁt function can be restated as:








+ di)(1 − ρi)
=[ fi − ρiei − ni(1 − ρi)]di − 2
p
ni(1 − ρi)di (10)
=[ fi − ρi(ei − ni) − ni)]di − 2
p
ni(1 − ρi)di (11)
It is natural to assume ei >n i; i.e., customers are less eﬃcient per unit of processing time than
the ﬁrm. Hence, the ﬁrst term is decreasing in ρi : you can charge less if the customer does more
self service. The second term is increasing in ρi: you push work to the customer and you don’t
have the server idle as much.
3.4 Economies of Scale
Firm i’s proﬁt function in (11) can also be written as
πi(fi,ρ i,f j)=( fi − ci)di − φid
γi
i (12)
where ci = ρi(ei − ni)+ni,φ i =2
p
ni(1 − ρi),γi =1 /2,.
Equation (12) shows that economies of scale exist when the ﬁrm provides some employee counter
10service with ρi 6=1 . If the ﬁrm requires complete self-service with ρi =1 , then constant returns to
scale exists instead.
3.5 Optimal Setting of the Self-service Level
From a long-run perspective, ρi , the level of self-service of the service product or the distribution
of the workload between the customer self-service server and the employee counter service server, is
a variable that a ﬁrm can change rather than a pre-speciﬁed constant. At the optimal performance




di ,w eh a v et h eﬁrm’s proﬁt as a function of (fi,ρ i,f j)
πi(fi,ρ i,f j)=[ fi − ρi(ei − ni) − ni)]di − 2
p
ni(1 − ρi)di (13)
With (fi,f j) ﬁxed,
∂πi
∂ρi













2 ≥ 0,ρ i ∈ [0,1] (15)
So πi(fi,ρ i,f j) is convex over ρi. As a result, the optimal setting of ρi is either one or zero,
depending on the value of the proﬁt function:
ρ∗
i =a r gm a x
ρi
πi(fi,ρ i,f j),ρ i ∈ {0,1} (16)
The fact that the proﬁt function is convex over ρi says that the ﬁrm’s proﬁt can be minimized
by attempting to implement an intermediate solution of some self service and some counter service.
This result predicts that extreme solutions should prevail, either ﬁrms push for complete self ser-
vice or they push for complete employee service. However, in practice many other factors such as
customer convenience, cross-selling, and other managerial issues may force ﬁrms to provide a com-
bined package of both types of services or to make both service channels available to the customer
by choosing 0 <ρ i < 1. In reality, a service can hardly be pure self-service without any employee
service required or pure employee service without any self-service involved. Thus, we expect that
a ﬁrm’s most proﬁtable strategy in the long-run is to provide a largely self-service-only product by
setting ρi close to one, or largely full-service product by setting ρi close to zero for certain levels of
service demand.
114 A Two-Firm Queuing Game with Service Co-production
4.1 A Two-Firm Symmetric Sub-game
Now we discuss the optimal strategy for two competitive ﬁrms in a symmetric game (wi = wj =
1,e i = ej = e,µi = µj = µ,ni = nj = n) with the linear demand function
di(fi,f j)=a − b(fi − fj),a > 0,b>0 (17)
4.1.1 Self-service vs. Self-service
Assume that both ﬁrms require complete self-service with no employee counter service provided:
ρi = ρj =1 .
We then have the following proﬁt function for Firm i (the same for Firm j):
πi (fi,f j)=( fi − ei)di
=( fi − ei)[a − b(fi − fj)]
= −bf2




= −2bfi + a + bei + bfj (19)
Since in a symmetric game the optimal full prices of the two ﬁrms are equal, f∗
i = f∗
j ,u s i n gt h e





























124.1.2 Full-service vs. Full-service
Assume that both ﬁrms provide full-service only with no self-service required or supported: ρi =
ρj =0 . We then have Firm i’s proﬁt function as below (the same for Firm j):
πi (fi,f j)=( fi − ni)di − 2
p
nidi
=( fi − ni)[a − b(fi − fj)] − 2
q
ni[a − b((fi − fj)]
= −bf2
i +[ a + b(ni + fj)]fi − 2
q




= a − 2bfi + bfj + bni + b
r
ni








i = a − bf∗






































4.1.3 Both: Combination of Self-service and Full-service
Assume that both ﬁrms provide a combination of self-service and employee service with the same
level of self-service required: 0 <ρ i = ρj < 1. We then have the following proﬁt function for Firm
i( t h es a m ef o rF i r mj )
πi(fi,f j)=[ fi − ρi(ei − ni) − ni)]di − 2
p




= −2bfi + bfj + a + bρiei + bni(1 − ρi)+b
s
ni(1 − ρi)

















































+ ni(1 − ρi) (41)
4.1.4 Summary of Symmetric Sub-game
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the three sub-games:
14Table 1 Results of Symmetric Sub-games
















































i (ρi = ρj =1 )<g ∗
i
¡
0 <ρ i = ρj < 1
¢
<g ∗
i (ρi = ρj =0 )
s∗
i s∗
i(ρi = ρj =0 )<s ∗
i
¡
0 <ρ i = ρj < 1
¢
<s ∗
i(ρi = ρj =1 )
p∗
i p∗
i(ρi = ρj =1 )<p ∗
i
¡
0 <ρ i = ρj < 1
¢
<p ∗
i(ρi = ρj =0 )
f∗
i (See Theorem 1)
d∗
i d∗
i(ρi = ρj =1 )=d∗
i
¡
0 <ρ i = ρj < 1
¢
= d∗
i(ρi = ρj =0 )
π∗
i π∗
i(ρi = ρj =0 )<π ∗
i
¡
0 <ρ i = ρj < 1
¢
<π ∗
i(ρi = ρj =1 )
Theorem 1 Consider a symmetric game for Firm i and Firm j in which wi = wj =1 ,e i =
ej = e,µi = µj = µ,ni = nj = n with linear demand functions di = a − b(fi − fj), and dj =
a − b(fj − fi).Deﬁne
f∗








i (ρi = ρj = 0) = argmax
fi
πi(fi,ρ i = ρj =0 ,f j) (43)
f∗
i (0 <ρ i = ρj < 1) = argmax
fi
πi(fi,0 <ρ i = ρj < 1,f j). (44)
Also deﬁne








,ρ i ∈ (0,1) (45)









,ρ i ∈ (0,1), (47)
15where it is easy to show that h1 <h 2 <h 3.Then
1. If ei <h 1, then f∗
i (ρi = ρj =1 )<f ∗
i (0 <ρ i = ρj < 1) <f ∗
i (ρi = ρj =0 ) .
2. If h1 <e i <h 2, then f∗
i (ρi = ρj =1 )<f ∗
i (ρi = ρj =0 )<f ∗
i (0 <ρ i = ρj < 1).
3. If h2 <e i <h 3, then f∗
i (ρi = ρj =0 )<f ∗
i (ρi = ρj =1 )<f ∗
i (0 <ρ i = ρj < 1).
4. If ei >h 3, then f∗
i (ρi = ρj =0 )<f ∗
i (0 <ρ i = ρj < 1) <f ∗
i (ρi = ρj =1 ) .
(The proofs of Theorem 1 is straightforward and thus is omitted herein).
A c c o r d i n gt oT a b l e1 - 2a n dT h e o r e m1 ,i nas y m m e t r i cg a m e :
1. The average counter service time is the longest in the (full-service, full-service) equilibrium
and the shortest (zero) in the (self-service, self-service) equilibrium. The converse is true in
t h ec a s eo fs e l f - s e r v i c et i m e .
2. The explicit price for the service product is the lowest in the (self-service, self-service) equi-
librium while the explicit price in the (full-service, full-service) equilibrium is the highest.
3. If customers are highly eﬃcient, the full price in the (self-service, self-service) equilibrium
is the lowest while the full price in the (full-service, full-service) equilibrium is the highest.
However, if customers are highly ineﬃcient, then the opposite is true. Interestingly, when
customers are neither super eﬃcient nor super ineﬃcient, the equilibrium in which customers
are required to complete part of the service task actually has the highest full price.
4. The most proﬁtable equilibrium is the (self-service, self-service) equilibrium for the two ﬁrms,
while the least proﬁtable equilibrium is the (full-service, full-service) equilibrium. This result
is consistent with Cachon and Harker (2002): both ﬁrms are better oﬀ when they both
outsource the work.
4.2 Two Firm Asymmetric Sub-game: Self-service vs. Full-service
Now we assume that Firm i requires complete self-service with no employee service provided, and
Firm j provides full-service with no self-service required or supported. In addition, we retain the
assumption that the two ﬁrms are identical in other aspects: wi = wj =1 ,e i = ej = e,µi =
µj = µ,ni = nj = n. Thus, the subgame is symmetric except that ρi =1 and ρj =0 . We also
retain the linear demand function assumption for Firm i and Firm j: di = a − b(fi − fj) and
16dj = a − b(fj − fi).Obviously di + dj =2 a.The proﬁt functions can be restated as
πi (fi,ρ i =1 ,f j)=( fi − ei)di(fi,f j)
πj
¡
fj,ρ j =0 ,f i
¢






= di(fi,f j) − b(fi − ei) (48)
∂πj
∂fj





=( 2 a − di(fj,f i)) − b(fj − n −
r
n
2a − di(fj,f i)
) (49)





















Also, using the demand functions, we have
πi (fi,f j)=( fi − ei)[ a − b(fi − fj)] (52)
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i < 2a (If d∗
i =2 a,t h e nd∗
j =0 , which means that Firm j exits the market, which






















(2a − br)−5/2 < 0, (59)
h(r) is concave over r.
Deﬁne



















Using the FOC, we have










+ ei) − (3 · 6−2/3 +6 1/3)b−1/3n−2/3 (62)
If h(− → r ) > 1, there exist two solutions to h(r)=1that could be local maximum of π(r). As o l u t i o n


















It can be shown that π∗
i (r) > 0,π∗
j (r) > 0 if and only if r1 <r<r 2. Note that r2 < − → r.So the
smaller solution to h(r)=1, r∗ =m i n { r| h(r)=1 }, is the unique equilibrium if r1 <r ∗ <r 2.
Note that if a>1
2b2/3n
1/3
j ,t h e nr1 <r 2.











(2a − br)−3/2 > 0. (67)
Since h(r) is concave over r, h(r) strictly increases as r increases when r<− → r.So if h(r1) <
1,h(r2) > 1,then there must exist an r∗ ∈ (r1,r 2) such that h(r∗)=1 ;and r∗ is the unique





























+ ei) − 4b−1/3n
−2/3
j > 1 (70)
is equal to






It can be shown that under the assumption a>1
2b2/3n
1/3
j , (nj− 3a
b )+4b−1/3n
1/3



















Thus, the following theorem shows that under certain conditions, there exists a unique equilibrium
in the market where both ﬁr m st oh a v ep o s i t i v ep r o ﬁts when one ﬁrm requires complete self-service
with no employee counter service provided and the other provides full-service with no self-service
required or supported.
Theorem 2 (Existence of Equilibrium in the Asymmetric Sub-game: Self-service vs. Full-service)
Assume that Firm i requires complete self-service with no employee counter service provided
and Firm j provides full-service with no self-service required or supported; i.e., ρi =1 ,ρ j =0 .A l s o
assume that wi = wj =1 ,e i = ej = e,µi = µj = µ,ni = nj = n, as well as linear demand functions



















































then there exists r∗, r∗ ∈ (r1,r 2), such that (ρ∗
i =1 ,ρ ∗
j =0 )is the unique equilibrium of the
game for Firm i and Firm j. In such an equilibrium, Firm i has a positive proﬁt π∗
i = b · r∗2 with
demand d∗
i = br∗ while Firm j has a positive proﬁt π∗
j = b(r∗− 2a
b )2−
p
nj(2a − br∗) w i t had e m a n d
d∗
j =2 a − br∗.
Theorem 2 states that the (self-service, full-service) equilibrium exists only when customer
eﬃciency is within certain range. That is, if customers are highly eﬃcient or highly ineﬃcient, the
two type of service ﬁrms may not both exist in market equilibrium. On the other hand, if customers
are not highly eﬃcient or highly ineﬃcient, it is possible for full-service ﬁrms and self-service-only
ﬁrms to coexist in a market equilibrium, a scenario we observe in many service industries.
4.3 A Two Firm Game: Self-service vs. Full-service
As shown in Section 3.5, the optimal setting of ρ for a ﬁrm is either zero or one in the long-
run. Therefore, in this section, we discuss a game with two ﬁrms in which each ﬁrm sets their
ρ equal to either zero or one with the assumption that that they are identical in other aspects:
wi = wj =1 ,e i = ej = e,µi = µj = µ,ni = nj = n.We also continue to assume that demand is a
linear function for both Firm i and Firm j: di = a − b(fi − fj),and dj = a − b(fj − fi).Obviously
di + dj =2 a. Deﬁne
fi = f∗
i (ρi =1 ,ρ j =0 ) (79)
e fi = f∗
i (ρi =0 ,ρ j =1 ) . (80)
20Consequently, we have
pi = p∗
i(ρi =1 ,ρ j =0 ) (81)
e pi = p∗
i(ρi =0 ,ρ j =1 ) . (82)
Also deﬁne:
di = d∗
i(ρi =1 ,ρ j =0 ) (83)
e di = d∗
i(ρi =0 ,ρ j =1 ) (84)
All the notations for Firm j are analogous. Since Firm i and Firm j are identical except ρi 6= ρj,
we denote:
fi = fj = f, e fi = e fj = e f (85)
pi = pj = p, e pi = e pj = e p (86)
di = dj = d, e di = e dj = e d (87)
In this section, we focus on characterizing the conditions for the existence of the three possible
equilibria: (self service, self-service), (full-service, full-service), and (self-service, full-service). We
show that the existence conditions can essentially be expressed as the limits of the explicit price of
the self-service-only product in a (self-service, full-service) equilibrium, pi.
T a b l e3s t a t e st h et w oﬁrms’ payoﬀs when they choose diﬀerent settings of ρ to compete with
each other.






















































Next we consider the conditions for the existence of the three types of equilibria: (self-service,
self-service), (full-service, full-service), and (self-service, full-service) individually.
4.3.1 Existence of a (Self-service, Self-service) Equilibrium
Obviously, x1 >x 4 always holds as n>0,a > 0. If x1 >x 2,x 3 >x 4, Firm i’s optimal strategy
is to set ρi =1no matter whether Firm j sets its ρj =0or ρj =1 . T h es a m eh o l d sf o rF i r mj .
Therefore, when x1 >x 2,x 3 >x 4, t h eu n i q u ee q u i l i b r i u mo ft h eg a m ew i l lb e(ρ∗
i =1 ,ρ ∗
j =1 ) .
That is, the optimal response for each ﬁrm will be to set the self-service level at one; i.e., to require
complete self-service.
Now we show such an equilibrium exists under certain conditions. Note that if e d ≤ a, then
x1 >x 2 holds. Similarly, if d ≥ a,t h e nx3 >x 4 holds.
Since e d + d =2 a and f = d










Based on the analysis above, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 3 (Existence of a (Self-service, Self-service) Equilibrium)
Consider a two-ﬁrm game in which wi = wj =1 ,e i = ej = e,µi = µj = µ,ni = nj = n.Deﬁne
pi = p∗






then there exist a unique equilibrium (ρ∗
i =1 ,ρ ∗













According to Theorem 3, for a (self-service, self-service) equilibrium to exist, a lower bound on
the optimal explicit price that the ﬁrm oﬀering self-service-only product charges in a (self-service,
full-service) competition scenario should not be violated. The fact that it is a lower bound on the
explicit price suggests that to make (self-service, self-service) a proﬁtable equilibrium for both ﬁrms,
the explicit price for self-service-only product must be suﬃciently high. Customers often demand a
relatively lower explicit price as compensation for their self-service due to their extra labor hours,
the delay of the service completion, and possibly lower quality due to their lack of professional skills.
As a result, a self-service-only product can usually charge a lower price than the price for similar
service product that is delivered with full-service. For example, the fee a customer is willing to pay
for trading stock by herself through an Internet trading company’s website is much lower than the
fee a customer is willing to pay for having a broker trade the stocks for her. This condition suggests
that if the market price for a self-service only product is too low, then (self-service, self-service)
cannot be market equilibrium because the proﬁt margin is too thin.
More importantly, though the higher proﬁtability associated with the (self-service, self-service)
equilibrium comes from the cost-savings generated by substituting the more expensive employee
service with less expensive self-service, this theorem suggests that the existence of such a proﬁtable
(self-service, self-service) equilibrium critically depends on the prevention of downstream price
competition (i.e., cutting the price low to increase the demand and lower average cost in the
presence of economies of scale). As we discussed above, economies of scale are present in the
queuing game unless both ﬁrms are self-service only. So when both ﬁrms outsource the service work
to the customer completely, each ﬁrm now faces constant returns to scale instead of economies of
scale, and the incentive to cut price in order to increase demand and lower average cost disappears.
This result shows that both ﬁrms become better oﬀ by outsourcing to the customers because it not
only lowers the ﬁrms’ costs but also eliminates the incentives for downstream price competition,
which is critical for the existence of the (self-service, self-service) equilibrium.
4.3.2 Existence of a (Full-service, Full-service) Equilibrium
If x2 >x 1,x 4 >x 3,aﬁrm is always better oﬀ by providing full-service than requiring complete self-
service, regardless of the other ﬁrm’s choice of its self-service level. Then (full-service, full-service)
with (ρ∗
i =0 ,ρ ∗






















which implies that a2
b −
√










































ne d−3/2 > 0 (104)
So π(e d) is convex over e d and dmin =a r gm i n
e d
π(e d)=2 −1/3b2/3n1/3,a n dminπ(e d)=π(dmin)=







,d 2 ∈ [0,2a]
¾
, (105)
then d2 >d min. So x2 >x 1 i fa n do n l yi f
e d>d 2 (106)
24As e d + d =2 a, this condition is equal to
2a − d>d 2, (107)
which equals
d<2a − d2 (108)
Thus, the condition for x2 >x 1, and x4 >x 3 to hold is
0 < d<min{2a − d2,d 1}, and a>b 2/3n1/3 (109)




0.22b2/3n1/3. As f = d
b + e, this condition equals
f<
min{2a − d2,d 1}
b
+ e (110)
As f = p + g + s where g =0and s = e. Thus, the condition is equal to
p<
min{2a − d2,d 1}
b
(111)
We then have the following theorem to characterize the condition for the existence of the (full-
service, full-service) equilibrium.
Theorem 4 (Existence of a (Full-service, Full-service) Equilibrium)
Assume a>b 2/3n1/3. Deﬁne
pi = p∗
















min{2a − d2,d 1}
b
(115)
then there exists the unique equilibrium of (ρ∗
i =0 ,ρ ∗
j =0 ) , in which both ﬁrms provide full-service

















25Note that according to Theorem 4, the condition for the existence of the (full-service, full-
service) equilibrium is represented by an upper bound on the explicit price for the self-service-only
product in a (self-service, full-service) competitive scenario. This suggests that the full-service ﬁrms
dominate the market if self-service-only ﬁrms fail to have enough demand at a high enough price to
be proﬁtable. We know that consumers are often unwilling to pay a high price for self-service-only
products as they demand some compensation for their self-service. As a result, self-service-only
ﬁrms usually have diﬃculty in raising their price without turning consumers away. As a result, they
often have to position themselves at the low cost end of the market. But if the price is too low to
generate a positive proﬁt margin, the self-service-only ﬁrms may have to exit the market. This may
partially explain why many business models which aimed at providing largely self-service-only type
service product through the Internet did not succeed in gaining enough market share or securing
enough market demand at a proﬁtable price and eventually failed.
4.3.3 Existence of a (Self-service, Full-service) Equilibrium
In this section, we discuss the condition for one ﬁrm’s optimal strategy to be the opposite of the
other ﬁrm’s choice between oﬀering full-service product and oﬀering self-service-only product. The
underlying assumption is that the other ﬁrm’s choice is known information by the time the decision
needs to be made. Thus, we relax the assumption that two ﬁrms make the decisions simultaneously,
in which case a (self-service, full-service) equilibrium may not exist. The assumption may hold in
a long-run multi-stage competition rather than the one-stage competition we have discussed so
far. Nevertheless, the existence condition for (self-service, full-service) equilibrium is x2 >x 1,and
x4 <x 3.
From the above analysis, we know that the condition for x2 >x 1 is




The condition for x4 <x 3 is
d1 < d<2a, a > b2/3n1/3; (117)
or
0 < d<2a, a ≤ b2/3n1/3. (118)
So the condition for x2 >x 1,x 4 <x 3 is
d1 < d<2a − d2,a > b 2/3n1/3; (119)
26or





b2/3n1/3 <a≤ b2/3n1/3. (120)
















b2/3n1/3 <a≤ b2/3n1/3. (122)
Thus, we have the following theorem that characterizes the conditions for the existence of a (self-
service, full-service) equilibrium:
Theorem 5 (Existence of a (Self-service, Full-service) Equilibrium)
Deﬁne
pi = p∗




















,a > b 2/3n1/3; (126)
or








b2/3n1/3 <a≤ b2/3n1/3. (127)
then the equilibrium of the two-ﬁrm game is either (ρ∗
i =1 ,ρ ∗
j =0 )or (ρ∗
i =0 ,ρ ∗
j =1 )in which one
ﬁrm requires complete self-service with no employee service committed while the other ﬁrm provides
full-service with no self-service required or supported.
Here the condition for the existence of a (self-service, full-service) equilibrium is essentially a
range of the explicit price for the self-service-only product with both lower and upper limits. It
suggests that both the self-service-only product providers and the full-service product providers can
coexist in a market equilibrium when the market price for the self-service only product is not too
low or too high. In other words, the two types of service ﬁrms can coexist in a market equilibrium
when the self-service-only product is not either cheap enough to drive the full-service ﬁrms out
of the market or too high to gain excessive market share. Though many other factors are likely
27involved, the price factor as stated in Theorem 5 has clearly played a role in the coexistence of both
types of service providers in many service industries.
4.3.4 Summary
In summary, in a two-ﬁrm one stage game, both (self-service, self-service) and (full-service, full-
service) can be market equilibria, but the two ﬁrms both make more proﬁts in a (self-service,
self-service) equilibrium. The conditions for the existence of diﬀerent equilibria can be represented
by the range of the explicit price for the self-service-only product in a (self-service, full-service)
competition scenario. The existence of a (self-service, self-service) equilibrium relies on the pre-
vention of downstream price cuts, which is realized by replacing economies of scale with constant
returns to scale through completely outsourcing the service task to the customer. On the other
hand, full-service ﬁrms dominate the market only when the self-service-only product fails to have
enough market demand at a proﬁtable price. If we consider that, in the long-run, the information
about the other ﬁrm’s choice between oﬀering full-service and self-service-only product is known, it
is possible for both types of service providers to coexist in a market equilibrium as each ﬁrm’s best
response strategy is always to position itself as diﬀerent from its rival. Such coexistence of both
types of ﬁrms is possible if the price for the self-service-only product is not too high or too low.
5 Summary and Discussion
With the queuing game model constructed herein, we have gained the following insights. First, we
found that in the long-run, a ﬁrm’s optimal strategy is either to require complete self-service or to
provide full-service. In fact, a ﬁrm can minimize its proﬁt by setting the proportion of the service
task outsourced to the customer between zero and 100%. This result suggests that, theoretically,
the two extreme formats of service delivery, complete self-service and full-service, will prevail rather
than any intermediate combinations of the two. However, in reality, ﬁrms may have both types of
service delivery channels available to its customers for many reasons. In fact, as we pointed out
before, it is often necessary and important to make personal customer care or support available
to the customers upon request when the service product is mainly delivered through self-service
channels. It is also important to have self-service channels available to the customer to increase
ﬂexibility and convenience when the service is delivered primarily through employee service. Not
doing so often results in poor service quality and customer dissatisfaction. This explains why
Internet banks need to have live customer representatives to answer phone calls from customers
who need personal attention or help, and why the traditional banks need to have websites and
ATMs in addition to branches. Nevertheless, as a strategic choice for the design of a service
28delivery process, ﬁrms should deliver a service either primarily through a self-service channel or
primarily through an employee-based delivery mechanism. A ﬁr mn e e d st oa v o i dap r o c e s sd e s i g n
in which both the employee and the customer are almost equally involved, in which case the ﬁrm
cannot gain the advantage of either format (the low cost associated with a self-service-only product
and the high price that it can charge for providing full-service) and thus, can actually minimize its
proﬁt.
Secondly, though either complete self-service or full-service can be the most proﬁtable choice in
long-run for a single ﬁrm, when competition is taken into account, self-service may be the better
choice since ﬁrms make more proﬁts in a (self-service, self-service) equilibrium. Such an equilibrium
actually creates a win-win situation for both the ﬁrms and the customer since the explicit price is
actually lower. Substituting employee labor with customer self-service often results in signiﬁcant
cost-savings in labor and other costs as well as the capital investments related to employee services.
However, we found that a (self-service, self-service) equilibrium may not exist if the downstream
price cut, which often occurs in the presence of economies of scale, is too deep. By simultaneously
outsourcing the service task completely to customers, the ﬁrms are able to transform economies
of scale into constant returns-to-scale. Consequently, the incentive for a downstream price cut
no longer exists, which essentially ensures the existence of a (self-service, self-service) equilibrium.
This ﬁnding emphasizes that economies of scale provides a strong incentive for outsourcing, either
to an outside supplier (Cachon and Harker 2002) or to the customer as in our model.
In addition, we also found that full-service providers can dominate markets only when self-
service-only providers fail to charge their customers a proﬁtable price. Consumers often demand
some price compensation from the ﬁrm for their self-service and they often require a signiﬁcant
price diﬀerence between a self-service-only product and a full-service product in order to switch
from full-service to self-service. When consumers are not willing to pay a price high enough for
self-service-only products, the self-service-only ﬁrms either cannot make proﬁts due to the low price
they charge or fail to grab enough market share from the full-service providers if they raise their
price. This may partially explain the failure of some self-service Internet business models in past
several years: the lack of enough market demand for the self-service-only product at a proﬁtable
price. However, when customers’ willingness to pay for the self-service product grows as they start
to agree to pay for the reduction of congestion, convenience, and ﬂexibility and some other unique
features associated with self-service-only products, full-service providers may lose some market
share to the self-service-only ﬁrms.
Finally, we found that both self-service-only ﬁrms and full-service ﬁrms can coexist in the market
if customers either are not highly eﬃcient nor highly ineﬃcient, and the price for self-service-only
product is neither too high nor too low. If customers are highly eﬃcient, a full-service product may
29not have much market demand; if customers are highly ineﬃcient, self-service may not be a feasible
solution for service delivery. In either case, one of the two types of ﬁrms cannot be sustained in
the market. If the price for the self-service only product is so cheap that customers’ willingness
to pay for full-service is diminished, or the price is just too high to consider, one of the two types
of ﬁrms are also driven out the market. Thus, in the long-run, when the explicit price for the
self-service-only product is not too high or too low, it is possible to have a market equilibrium in
which self-service-only ﬁrms and full-service ﬁrms are both available to the consumers. Though
other factors may have also contributed to the coexistence of two types of service delivery channels
in more and more service industries (e.g., the coexistence of Internet trading ﬁrms and traditional
brokerage companies), we beleive that the customer eﬃciency and price factors discussed herein
have played signiﬁcant roles.
In our model, we deﬁne ρ as the level of self-service, or the proportion of the workload outsourced
to the customer. An alternative interpretation of ρ is the proportion of customers who are served
through self-service channels. With this new deﬁnition, the total time that a customer of Firm i is
expected to spend in order to receive the service remains as:
ρiei +
1
µi − di(1 − ρi)
(1 − ρi). (128)
That is, the probability for a customer to spend ei amount of time is ρi and the probability for a
customer to spend 1
µi−di(1−ρi) amount of time is (1−ρi), since each customer has the probability ρi
of being served through the self-service channel and the probability (1−ρi) of being served through
the employee service channel. Consistently, the average service rate for employee service remains
as:
µi =( g−1
i + di)(1 − ρi) (129)
while the average time that a customer is expected to spend to receive the service through employee
channel is gi = 1
µi−di(1−ρi)(1 − ρi). Thus, Firm i’s cost function remains unchanged:
Ci = niµi = ni(g−1
i + di)(1 − ρi),ρ i ∈ [0,1] (130)
Consequently, Firm i’s proﬁt function remains unchanged:
πi(fi,g i,ρ i,f j)=( fi − ρiei − gi)di − ni(g−1
i + di)(1 − ρi),ρ i ∈ [0,1] (131)
Therefore, there exists a direct mapping of the two interpretations without any changes to the
model. Since many service ﬁrms now have both self-service channels and employee service channels
available to serve customers, the decision about what proportion of the customer population should
30be served through the self-service channel is crucial for resource planning and, thus, has signiﬁcant
managerial implications. Our model makes it possible to explore how such a decision should be
made in a competitive environment. A further extension with customer heterogeneity (diﬀerent
opportunity costs and eﬃciencies) taken into consideration in such decision making would bring
even more managerial insights to this issue.
There are several potential extensions of our current study that will further our understanding
of the issues regarding service coproduction, customer eﬃciency, and market competition. In par-
ticular, some of the assumptions we have made with the current model may be relaxed or adjusted
in future research.
For example, we can relax the constraint that customer eﬃciency ei is a pre-speciﬁed constant
and consider ei as a function of ρi; i.e., ei(ρi) is convex increasing in ρi. This would suggest
that customers become less eﬃcient as the proportion of the workload they are assigned increases.
Depending on how convex ei(ρi) is, there may or may not be an interior optimal ρi.I ft h e r ei sa n
interior optimal ρi, then the analysis of the game will be more complex. The results may generate
some insights into the trade-oﬀ between the proportion of the workload outsourced to the customer
and the eﬃciency of customer self-service and its impact on market competition. In addition, we
may allow the ﬁrm to invest in reducing ei and study how the investment in ei may inﬂuence the
competition. If we assume that ei is independent of ρi, then the ﬁrm invests in ei reduction only
if it plans on choosing ρi =1 ;i.e., invest in self service only if you plan to use only self service.
Since the two competing ﬁrms would then have a constant returns to scale technology, this would
be analogous to two competing ﬁrms investing in cost reduction.
Another possible extension is to allow for multiple customer types rather than to assume cus-
tomer homogeneity in terms of their opportunity costs. In our current model, we assume that
customers have uniform opportunity costs. In future research, we may relax this assumption and
instead assume that some customers are willing to pay more for self-service than others due to
diﬀerent opportunity costs of time. As we have seen, the explicit price that customers are willing
to pay for the self-service only product is the decisive factor for the existence of diﬀerent market
equilibria; this extension will take a further step toward incorporating customers’ inﬂuence on pric-
ing. Since in our model customers react only to the full price in the demand function rather than
individual parts of the full price (the explicit market price, the price for self-service, and the price
for employee service), the model and the major conclusions should remain structurally unchanged
after relaxing the homogeneity assumption of customers’ opportunity costs. However, as customers
may now have diﬀerent opportunity cost, the speciﬁc value of a ﬁrms’ price and proﬁts in a par-
ticular market equilibria may change. Consequently, the speciﬁc value of the range for customer
eﬃciency in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 and the ranges for the explicit price of the self-service-only
31product in Theorems 3-5 may change as a result. Further exploration of this issue is on our future
research agenda.
It is also worth exploring whether the major conclusions and results from this two-ﬁrm game
model can be applied to a similar game with more than two ﬁrms; e.g., n ﬁrms that are symmetric
in all respects except the self-service levels of their respective products. In a symmetric game,
when all n ﬁrms set their self-service level at the same value, each ﬁrm would have the same market
share or the same constant demand. The results of the game would then be similar to what we
have in a two-ﬁrm symmetric game. However, if the ﬁrms choose diﬀerent self-service levels and,
therefore, the game is asymmetric, the results may depend on how the ﬁrms’ full prices would
inﬂuence each others’ demand. In a simpliﬁed scenario, we may assume a linear demand function
for a ﬁrm in which a ﬁrm’s demand depends solely on the diﬀerence between its full price and
that of the ﬁrm with the lowest full price in the market. The n-ﬁrm game then becomes analogous
to (n-1) two-ﬁrm games between the ﬁrm that charges the lowest full price and each of the other
(n-1) ﬁrms. These two-ﬁrm games will be structurally similar to the two-ﬁrm game herein with
the added constraint that the two ﬁrms charge diﬀerent full prices, which is consistent with the
results from our current two-ﬁrm model for the asymmetric game. With such a simpliﬁed demand
function, we would expect that the major results and conclusions in regard to the n-ﬁrm game will
r e m a i ns t r u c t u r a l l ys i m i l a rt ow h a tw eh a v ef r o mt h et w o - ﬁrm game, although the speciﬁcv a l u e s
and ranges for the parameters and variables in the theorems may change. For a more complicated
demand function for the n ﬁrms that consider the inﬂuence of the interactions between any two
ﬁrms’s full prices on each ﬁrm’s demand, we may need make some structural changes in the model
to incorporate these interactions and, therefore, this extension is left for future research.
Our study has made a ﬁrst step toward understanding the relationships among self-service level,
customer eﬃciency, and the market competition between ﬁrms that choose diﬀerent channels to
deliver its service, and how those relationships impact a ﬁrm’s strategic choice of its service delivery
process. The issues involved have become increasingly important with the rapid development of
both self-service technologies and service operation models with customers’ participating at all
level in more and more situations. We expect further studies in this area to gain more insights into
these important and timely issues facing service management researchers and practitioners across
industries.
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